Rosalinda Ignacio M. Burkhart, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roland R. Miranda, Rita T. Miranda, Defendants-Appellees, Guam Housing Corporation and United States Small Business Administration

: r-rs 2{3 14 37 5 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM ROSALINDA IGNACIO M. BURKHART, Plaintiff Appellant, V. ROLAND R. MIRANDA, RITA T. MIRANDA, Defendants-Appellees, GUAM HOUSING CORPORATION and UNITED STATES SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Defendants. Supreme Court Case No. CVA11-012 Superior Court Case No. CV0492-09 OPINION Cite as: 2013 Guam 2 Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam Argued and submitted on February 13, 2012 Hagatna, Guam Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellant: Ron Moroni , Esq. Moroni Law Offices San Ramon Bldg. 115 San Ramon St., Ste. 301 Hagatna, GU 96910 Appearing for Defendants-Appel lees: James M aher, Esq. 140 Aspinall Ave., Ste. 201 Hagatna, GU 96910 OVGNAL Burkhart v. Miranda, 2013 Guam 2, Opinion Page 2 of 15 BEFORE: F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Chief Justice; ROBERT J. TORRES, Associate Justice; and KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice. TORRES, J.:Ask ⌕

[1]Plaintiff-Appellant Rosalinda Ignacio M. Burkhart appeals two separate decisions and orders of the trial court. The first decision and order denied her motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of Defendants-Appellees Roland R. Miranda and Rita T. Miranda's counterclaims and granted Roland and Rita's motion for summary judgment alleging Rosalinda's claim was time barred. The second decision and order granted Roland and Rita's additional motion for summary judgment to reform a defective deed and quiet title in their names. Rosalinda argues on appeal that the trial court erred in (1) granting Roland and Rita's first motion for summary judgment dismissing her complaint; (2) denying her first motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of Roland and Rita 's counterclaims; and (3) granting Roland and Rita's second motion for summary judgment to reform the deed and quiet title.Ask ⌕⧉ cite

[2]For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. 1. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 131 Th i s cas e st ems fro m a d i s pu t e bet ween famil y memb ers o ver t h e ti t l e to t h e h o u se an d lot more part icul arl y des cribed as C adas t ral Lot Number 12, B l ock Number 2, Es t at e Number 12008, Suburban, Subdivision of Tract 85 in Piti, Gu a m ("the Property"). The Property is registered land and was at one time registered to Raymond C. Miranda and Jesusa L. Miranda, h u s b a n d a n d wi fe, as jo i nt t en ant s . In Jan uary 1980, R aymo n d C . Mi ran d a q u i t cl aimed h i s interest in the Property to his wife Jesusa, and shortl y thereafter the coupl e divorced.Ask ⌕⧉ cite

[4]In April 1987, Jesusa executed a general power of attorney giving her son, Raymond I. Miranda, Jr. ("Raymond Jr."), power to conduct transactions on her behalf. At trial, Jesusa Burkhart v. Miranda, 2013 Guam 2, Opinion Page 3 of 15 declared that she was not in Guam at the time of execution of the deed, and that while she wanted someone to handle her affairs for her, she did not intend for the power of attorney to last indefinitely. Four years later, Raymond Jr. executed a warranty deed granting the Property to Jesusa's other son, Roland R. Miranda. The deed did not provide that Raymond Jr. was acting as attorney-in-fact for Jesusa, and Jesusa claimed she never authorized Raymond Jr. to transfer ownership of the Property to Roland. Furthermore, the deed incorrectly identified Raymond Jr. as the grantor. Jesusa did acknowledge that sometime in 1991, Raymond Jr. called her to discuss the possibility of Roland using the Property as collateral for a loan, but she expressed that she did not want to sell the Property to Roland, and Raymond did not have her authority to sell the Property. Jesusa stated she only learned of the purported transfer to Roland years later. 151 Roland argued he had an agreement with his mother Jesusa to buy the Property. Roland declared that the agreement was brokered by Raymond at his "mother's behest." He stated that pursuant to the agreement, he and Rita obtained a loan from the Guam Housing Corporation, satisfied the existing mortgage on the land,' and remitted approximately $15,000.00 to his mother. Id. [61 For many years, Roland and Rita and their family lived on the Property. Roland claimed they made extensive improvements such as installing new plumbing and tiles, remodeling the kitchen, installing new internal and external doors, as well as painting the interior and exterior of the house.2 Rita and Roland also paid the annual real property tax assessments. Jesusa did not dispute that Roland lived there with his family but stated that she allowed him to live in the Roland and Rita submitted documents to show that on May 8, 1991 they paid off an existing loan of $13,403.00 on the property. 2 Roland stated in his deposition that he did m ost of the work himself and did not have any records of the improvements. He stated, however, that a "substantial amount of m oney" was invested in materials over the years. RA, tab 41, Ex. 9 at 1-3 (Not. Mot. & Mot. Summ. J., Oct. 27, 2009). Burkhart v. Miranda, 2013 Guam 2, Opinion Page 4 of 15 house rent-free because he is her son. She added, however, that she never told him he could take ownership of the home, and that he never told her that he regarded himself as the owner. She also stated that she never took any action to remove Roland from the house because he was there with her permission, but not under any claim of ownership. Roland differed and asserted that from April of 1991 to March of 2009, Jesusa visited them at the Property over 100 times, and during this period, she referred to the Property as "your place." RA, tab 40 at 2 (Decl. Roland R. Miranda, Oct. 22, 2009). [71 In August 2007, Jesusa executed a deed of gift for the Property in favor of her daughter, Rosalinda. Jesusa stated that this was the only transfer she ever made of the property. Rosalinda later filed a complaint in the trial court against Roland and Rita for: (1) ejectment for unlawful withholding of property; (2) rent in the amount of $2,500.00 per month from February 2008 onwards, for the duration of the detention;3 (3) quiet title; and (4) damages for removal of clouds on title. RA, tab 3 (Compl., Mar. 20, 2009). 18] Roland and Rita answered the complaint and raised numerous affirmative defenses. Roland and Rita also filed a counterclaim arguing that as a result of Rosalinda's fraud, Rosalinda should be deemed an involuntary trustee holding the property in trust for Roland and Rita. Roland and Rita's counterclaim also requested the court to reform the 1991 warranty deed to express the true intended conveyance of "Jesusa I. Miranda" as grantor instead of "Raymond I. Miranda, Jr." Rosalinda moved for partial summary judgment regarding counts 1 and 2 of the counterclaim because count I failed to allege fraud with sufficient particularity, and because count 2's request for reformation was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in 7 GCA § Th e Deed o f Gift was gran ted on August 15, 2007. It is unclear why the com plaint only asks for rent from February 2008 onwards. RA, tab 6, ex A at I (Deed of Gift, Feb. 13, 2008). Burkhart v. Miranda, 2013 Guam 2, Opinion Page 5 of 15 11305(d). According to Rosalinda, that claim was barred because the alleged mistake, which formed the basis for reformation, was made when the deed was signed more than three years earlier. Roland and Rita also filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Rosalinda's actions were time-barred under §7 GCA § 11205Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding because she was not seized or possessed of the Property within five years before the commencement of her complaint. [91 The trial court denied Rosalinda ' s motion for partial summary judgment on count 1, concluding that Roland and Rita's counterclaim contained sufficient detail to satisfy Guam Rules of Civil P rocedure Rule 9 (b)'s requirements that the circumstances constituting fraud be pleaded with particularity . The court also denied Rosalinda's motion on count 2, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed which precluded summary judgment. The court determined that while Raymond " admits he knew what he was signing, it is questionable that he knew [the deed] was a mistake," and if Roland and Rita did not have a reasonable belief the house was conveyed to them they would have had no reason to pay property taxes, take out mortgages , and make improvements and repairs. 1101 The trial court granted Roland and Rita's separate summary judgment motion, finding that Rosalinda' s right to file a claim stems from her mother' s right, and therefore was barred by the five-year statute of limitations found in §7 GCA § 11205.Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding The court also found Rosalinda could not point to any prejudice resulting from Roland and Rita raising their time limitation defense in a motion for summary judgment rather than as an affirmative defense, and Roland and Rita had a superior claim to the property because they received their deed in 1991 whereas Rosalinda received hers in 2008. 1111 Thereafter, Roland and Rita filed a second motion for summary judgment requesting the court to quiet title in their name and to reform the deed. The trial court granted the motion and Burkhart v. Miranda, 2013 Guam 2, Opinion Page 6 of 15 reiterated that the time for anyone to claim an interest in the property adverse to Roland and Rita had already expired. A judgment was entered, and Rosalinda timely filed an appeal.4 II. JURISDICTIONAsk ⌕⧉ cite

[12]This court has jurisdiction over appeals from a final judgment. 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424l (a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 112-207(2012)); 7 GCA §§ 3107, 3108(a) (2005). III. STANDARD OF REVIEWAsk ⌕⧉ cite

[13]We review the grant of a summary judgment motion de novo. Wasson v. Berg, 2007 Guam 16 i¶ 9 (citing Nat 'I Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Guam Hous. & Urban Renewal Auth., 2003 Guam 19 ¶ 12).Ask ⌕⧉ cite

[14]Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Town House Dept Stores, Inc. v_ Dep't of Educ., 2012 Guam 25 ¶ 11 (citing Mendiola v. Bell, 2009 Guam 15 ¶ 11). "`[O]ur duty is to interpret statutes in light of their terms and legislative intent."' People v. Flores, 2004 Guam 18 ¶ 8 (quoting Carlson v. Guam Tel. Auth., 2002 Guam 15 ¶ 46 n.7) (alteration in original). IV. ANALYSISAsk ⌕⧉ cite

[15]Rosalinda argues that the trial court erred in: (1) granting Roland and Rita's first motion for summary judgment dismissing her complaint; (2) denying her first motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Roland and Rita's counterclaims on the first two causes of action; and (3) granting Roland and Rita's second motion for summary judgment to reform the deed and to quiet title. We will initially review the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing J Roland and Rita filed a statement pursuant to Guam Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule I7(e)(2) indicating that they would not file a brief on appeal. Burkhart v. Miranda, 2013 Gu am 2, Opin ion Page 7 of 15 Rosalinda's complaint which relied in part on §7 GCA § 11205.5Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding Then we will address Roland and Rita's counterclaims for reformation. Resolution of these issues will elucidate whether the trial court was correct in granting Roland and Rita's second summary judgment motion to reform the deed and to quiet title. A. Dismissal of Rosalinda ' s complaint 1161 Ro land and Ri t a's mai n argu men t in their motion for s u mmary j u d gmen t seek ing di smis sal of Rosal inda's complaint i s that i t was t ime-barred by 7 GC A § 11205 becaus e Jesusa (and Rosalinda as her successor in interest) had only until April 1996 to bring an action for recovery of th e property.6 Rosalinda's opposition asserted that she, or her predecessor in interest, were seized of the property because she had legal title and it was not necessary that she be in actual possession of the property in order to bring her complaint.7 Rosalinda further cites to 21 GC A § 29136s to s ubs tanti at e her argument that t he st at ute of l imitati ons found in secti on 11205 does not bar her case because, under section 29136, title to registered land cannot be acqu ired b y ad vers e po ss es si on . Sh e al so rel ies o n §21 GCA § 2Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding 9 14 0 to argue R o land and R it a's title cannot prevail against her title as a registered owner.9 Therefore, s he submits, sectio n 11 205 does not apply, and she is not barred from bringi ng her complaint. s Section 11205 provides: "No action for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof, can be maintained, unless it appear that the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor, or grantor, was seized or possessed of the property in question, within five years before the comm encement of the action." §7 GCA § 11205Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding (2005). 6 This date is five years after the warranty deed from Raymond Jr. to Roland. 7 The last two certificates o f title fo r the Property issued by the Department of Land Management certified Jesusa (October 25, 1995 Certificate of Title Number 104234) and then Rosalinda (January 28, 2010 Certificate of Title Nu mber 124897) as the registered own er. RA, tab 58, at ex. 15 (Decl. Jam es Maher, Oct. 22, 2009). 8 Title §21 GCA § 29136Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding provid es: "After land has been registered, no title thereto adverse or in derogation to the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by any length of possession." §21 GCA § 29136Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding (2005). 9 Title §21 GCA § 29140Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding pro vides: "No unregistered estate, interest, power, right, claim, contract, or trust shall prevail against the title of a registered owner taking bona fide for a valuable consideration or of any person bona fide claiming through or under him." §21 GCA § 29140Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding (2005). Burkhart v. Miranda, 2013 Gu am 2, Opin ion Page 8 of 15 1171 The trial court recognized section 11205 does not apply to registered land and title cannot be defeated based on adverse possession. Nevertheless, the court inexplicably stated that "[a]lthough the property in question is registered land, [Rosalinda]'s claim in using §21 GCA § 29136Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding and §21 GCA § 29140Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding to defeat [Roland and Rita]'s Motion for Summary Judgment is inapplicable to defeat [Roland and Rita]'s Motion for Summary Judgment." RA, tab 65 at 3 (Dec. & Order, Aug. 31, 2010). Consequently, the court agreed with Roland and Rita that any right Rosalinda has stems from her mother's rights, and this includes whether Rosalinda's right to bring her complaint is subject to a five-year limitations period under section 11205.0 RA, tab 65 at 1 (Dec. & Order). [181 Clearly, the statute of limitations in §7 GCA § 11205Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding does not apply when registered land is involved. "[T]he requirement of seisin or possession is met when it is established that the plaintiff was possessed of legal title, and this seisin can be destroyed only by establishing the fact that a title by adverse possession was acquired by the defendant." Taitano v. Calvo Fin. Corp., 2008 Guam 12 ¶ 33 (quoting Tobin v. Stevens, 251 Cal. Rptr. 587, 589 (Ct. App. 1988)). The right of possession-upon which Rosalinda demands for ejectment, rent, quiet title, and removal of clouds on the title-is based on her being the registered owner. This can only be defeated by adverse possession. The law is well established that one cannot adversely possess registered land. §21 GCA § 29136Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding (2005); see also Flores v. Camacho, No. 84-0064A, 1985 WL 56582, at *2 (D. Guam App. Div. July 15, 1985) (claim for adverse possession defeated because plaintiffs conceded that defendants had a certificate of title); Hair v. Pangilinan, No. 85-0059A, 1986 WL 68921, at *1 (D. Guam App. Div. Aug. 13, 1986) (lands subject to the Guam Land Title 10 The court did not specifically explain why 21 GCA §§ 29136 and 29140 were inapplicable but one can presume that it believed the warranty deed from Raymond Jr. to Roland and Rita divested Jesusa of title to the Property. Burkhart v. Miranda, 2013 Guam 2, Opinion Page 9 of 15 Registration Act are not subject to adverse possession). The provisions of Title 7, Chapter 11, Article 2 of the Guam Code Annotated, including section 11205, do not apply because the land in this case was registered under the Guam Land Title Registration Act. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on its determination that Rosalinda's right to bring her complaint was subject to a five-year limitations period under section 11205. We now must address the validity of the warranty deed from Raymond Jr. to Roland. B. The Validity of the Warranty Deed 1191 Rosalinda argues Roland and Rita's claim for reformation of the deed is barred by the statute of limitations because Raymond Jr. read the deed before he signed it, and therefore he is deemed to have knowledge of the contents at that time. Appellant's Br. at 26 (Oct. 3, 2011). Rosalinda's argument is misplaced because the issue is not when Raymond Jr. had knowledge that the deed did not provide he was acting as attorney-in-fact for Jesusa, but rather when Roland, as the grantee, had knowledge of this error. 1201 Neither party argues t he deed is inval id because of the erro r in its ex ecuti on; ho wever, the deed did not comply with Guam law on the acknowledgement for transferring an estate in real property by an attorney-in-fact. Title §21 GCA § 4105Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding requires that Raymond Jr., when executing the deed as att orney-in-fact, mus t s ubs cri be the name of hi s principal, Jesus a, and hi s own name, as at to rn ey-i n -fact . " See 21 GC A § 4 1 0 5 (2 0 0 5 ). Th i s was n ot d on e. RA, t ab 1 3 , E x . 2 at 1 (Defs.' Answer & Countercl., Apr. 21, 2009). Section 4105 is adopted from California Civil C ode § 1095. See 21 GC A § 4105, S OUR C E. Cal iforni a case l aw const rui ng t he i dent ical statute is therefore persuasive. See Torres v. Torres, 2005 Guam 22 ¶ 33 (stating the source of " Title §21 GCA § 4105Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding provides: "When an attorney in fact executes an instrument transferring an estate in real property, he must subscribe the name of his principal to it, and his own name as attorney in fact." Burkhart v. Miranda, 2013 Guam 2, Opinion Page 10 of 15 Guam's Civil Code is the California Civil Code, and California case law which interprets code provisions that parallel Guam's is persuasive when there is no compelling reason to deviate from California's interpretation); Sumitomo Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Zhong Ye, Inc., 199 7 Guam 8 ¶ 7 ("Generally, when a legislature adopts a statute which is identical or similar to one in effect in another jurisdiction, it is presumed that the adopting jurisdiction applies the construction placed on the statute by the originating jurisdiction." (citation omitted)).Ask ⌕⧉ cite

[21]In Hodge v. Hodge, under a power of attorney, a wife incorrectly signed a deed at tempt ing t o creat e a j oi nt tenancy in her and her husband's name. 64 Cal. Rptr. 587, 588 (C t. Ap p . 1967). Th e wi fe wro te h er h u sb an d's n ame, b u t s h e di d no t si gn her own name. Id. T h e court held the deed was invalid under California Civil Co d e section 1095 (the California equivalent of §21 GCA § 4105Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding). Id. at 589; see also Acevedo v. Pimentel, ⟂15 P.2d 795Persuasive authoritynon-Guam — not binding under the reception rule, 797 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932) ("Evidently the deed . . . is not a valid conveyance to the defendant, es peci al ly as t he at torney-i n-fact di d not 'subs cri be t he name of hi s pri ncipal to i t, and hi s own name as att orn ey i n fact[.]"' (citi ng Cal. Ci v. C ode § 1 095 )); Mitch ell v. B enja min Franklin Bond & Ind em. Corp., ⟂57 P.2d 185Persuasive authoritynon-Guam — not binding under the reception rule, 186 (1936) ("The law is well settled that a deed in the name of an att orney-i n-fact, even i f to t he si gn atu re i s add ed t he wo rd s, `Att y for (a named p rin ci pal), ' do es not pass the principal's title to the property described in such deed."); Morrison v. Bowman, 29 Cal . 33 7, 3 52 (18 65 ) ("[W]h en a pers on h avin g po wer to s el l an d con vey real est at e fo r an ot her, undert akes t o exerci s e t he power, t he act performed mus t be i n the name of t he pri ncipal, or i t wil l not bind him."). 1221 The d eed name s Raymond Jr. as t he gra ntor; Jesusa's name doe s not appe ar on the document as the grantor. RA, tab 13, Ex. 2 at 1 (Defs.' Answer & Countercl.). This i s unmistakably incorrect as Raymond Jr., when executing the deed as attorney-in-fact, should have Burkhart v. Miranda, 2013 Gu am 2, Opin ion Page 11 of 15 subscribed the name of his principal, Jesusa, and his own name as attorney-in-fact. Failure to comply with section 4105 renders the deed void.Ask ⌕⧉ cite

[23]Ro land an d R it a's argument fo r reformat io n is no w i rrel evant . RA, t ab 1 3 at 6 (An s wer to Compl. & Counterel.). Void agreements cannot be reformed. Ainsworth v. Morrill, ⟂160 P. 1089Persuasive authoritynon-Guam — not binding under the reception rule , 1 090 (C al. Di st. Ct. Ap p. 191 6) ("It i s elementary that a vo id agreement has no st and ing in the l aw, and cons equent l y i t can nei t her be reformed nor enforced."); Sel over v. Am. Russian Commercial Co., ⟂7 Cal. 2Persuasive authoritynon-Guam — not binding under the reception rule 66, 275 (1857) ("Defective deeds . . . cannot be reformed, even in chancery."). Equity also cannot reform a void deed. Id.; see also Hed ges v. Dixon Cnry., ⟂150 U.S. 18Persuasive authoritynon-Guam — not binding under the reception rule 2, 192 (1893) ('-[W]here th e tran saction or the contract is declared void becaus e [it i s] not in co mp l i an ce wi t h express statutory or cons titu tio nal provisi on[s], a court of eq u i t y can no t interpose to give validity to such transaction or contract .. . . " ); Du n ca n v. Jen ki n s , 286 S.W. 783, 784 (Ky. 1926) ("[11t is well settled that statutes are as binding on courts of equity as on cou rts o f l a w, and, wh ere a con t ract is vo i d b ecau s e [it is] n o t i n co mp l i an ce wi t h ex p res s st at ut ory provis ions , a court of equit y cannot modi fy i t, s o as t o make i t legal, and t hen enforce it. "). Al t h o u gh t h e d eed i s vo i d , t hat d o es n o t en d t h e anal ys i s b ecau s e even th o u gh th e d eed from Raymond Jr. does not operate to convey an estate in real property on behalf of Jesusa, it may reflect an agreement to con vey the p ro pert y. C . Deed May P rovide Evidence of an AgreementAsk ⌕⧉ cite

[24]While the deed executed by Raymond Jr. is void, it is not immaterial. The deed may still provide evidence of an agreement by Jesusa or her duly appointed attorney-in-fact to convey the property to Roland. Hodge recognizes the statute renders the deed void, but it may still be useful in ascertaining whether there was an agreement to transfer the property: Burkhart v. Miranda, 2013 Guam 2, Opinion Page 12 of 15 The manner of execution of a deed by an attorney in fact for the grantor is prescribed by statute. He must subscribe the name of hi s principal to the instrument, and then his own as attorney in fact. If the instrument is not executed in this manner, it does not operate as a conveyance by the principal, though it may be sufficient as a memorandum of an agreement to convey the property described. 64 Cal. Rptr. at 589 (internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, in ascertaining on remand whether there was an agreement to transfer the property, both parties still may possess avenues in which to obtain the relief they seek. D. The Statute of Limitations is no Longer an Issue 1251 The parties dispute whether the statute of limitations, specifically §7 GCA § 11305Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding(d), bars relief to Roland and Rita.12 Rosalinda argues Roland should be charged with knowledge of the error in the deed because he "signed the deed and read its content in 1991." Appellant's Br. at 29. In fact, Roland's signature is not on the warranty deed. RA, tab 13 Ex. 2 at 1 (Defs.' Answer & Countercl.). We disagree with Rosalinda and believe Roland cannot be charged with knowledge of the error in 1991. 1261 In i n t erp ret i n g t h e t erm "d i s co very" i n t h i s cas e, we s t art wi t h , b u t are n o t l i mi t ed t o , analysis of section 11305. Under section 11305(d), we have held that the cause of action in a fraud or mi st ake cl ai m accrues when the claimant, exercising reas onable dili gence, obtains information that would put a reasonable person on inquiry. See Gayle v. Hemlani, 2000 Guam 25 ¶ 2 5; Tai tan o, 20 0 8 Gu am 12 ¶ 4 5 . In Ga yle, this cou rt affi rmed th e t rial cou rt's fi ndi ng t hat defendant's counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud, in response to plaintiffs attempt to declare an option granted in 1972, was barred in 1999 by section 11305. 200 0 Gua m 2 5 ¶ 4 8. "We have held that the statute of limitations will begin to run when the i2 Section 11305 lim its the time for com mencing "[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake" to three years, "[t]he cause of action in such case not to be deem ed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or m istake." §7 GCA § 11305Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding(d) (2005). Burkhart v. Miranda, 2013 Guam 2, Opinion Page 13 of 15 plaintiff suspects or should suspect that his injury was caused by wrongdoing or that someone has done something wrong to him." Id. ¶ 24 (citing Custodio v. Boonprakong, 1999 Guam 5 ¶ 27). We further cited to Custodio to explain why `'discovery" takes place when one suspects a potential cause of action: "A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific [f]acts necessary to establish the claim . . . . [o]nce the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, he must decide whether to file suit or sit on his rights." Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Custodio, 1999 Guam 5 ¶ 27) (interpreting this jurisdiction's discovery statute in medical malpractice claims). On the issue of discovery, we indicated that "[d]iscovery occurs when a plaintiff could have discovered the wrongful acts with reasonable diligence." Id. ¶ 25 (citing Bourland v. Salas, No. 82-0224A, 1986 WL 68918, at *4 (D. Guam App. Div. Oct. 24, 1986)). On the basis of this interpretation of section 11305, we found that because the defendant had received the benefit of legal counsel, was not in a position to invest a great deal of trust in opposing counsel, and failed to raise the breach of fiduciary duty claim or constructive fraud arguments earlier in spite of filing suit in the past, the defendant's counterclaims were barred. Id. ¶¶ 36, 39, 43. [271 Turning back to the present c ase, the issue of whet her Rol and and Rita's claim for reformation is barred under §7 GCA § 11305Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding(d) is irrelevant because, as stated above, a void deed cannot be reformed. However, the question of when Roland and Rita "discovered" the error in the deed is important in determining the commencement of the statute of limitations period on any claim that the deed constituted an agreement to convey the property. 1281 Here, Roland, as the grantee, did not sign the deed but duly recorded it. RA, tab 13 ex. 2 at 1 (Defs.' Answer & Countercl.). Roland and Rita obtained title documents and loans from lenders experienced in real estate transactions based on the warranty deed. RA, tab 40 at 1 Burkhart v. Miranda, 2013 Guam 2, Opinion Page 14 of 15 (Decl. of Roland R. Miranda, Oct. 22, 2009). If these trained professionals did not find any discrepancies in the deed, we cannot, with clear conscience, charge Roland and R ita with knowledge of the error.Ask ⌕⧉ cite

[29]From 1991 to 2008, no events occurred to arouse the suspicions of Roland and Rita as discussed in Custodio. See 1999 Guam ¶ 27. They received mortgages from lenders, and Jesusa frequently visited the house allegedly referring to it as "your place." RA, tab 40 at 1-2 (Decl. Roland R. Miranda). Rosalinda's unidentified letter instructing Roland and Rita to vacate would likely not be sufficient to place them on notice because, without further evidence, they would have no reason to believe the anonymous letter to be credible or that they would not otherwise be legally in possession of the Property based on their seventeen years of occupancy. RA, tab 13 at 6 (Defs.' Answer & Countercl.). Therefore, the earliest stage of possible discovery occurred when Rosalinda filed suit.Ask ⌕⧉ cite

[30]Yet, even at t hat point i n t i me, R oland and Ri t a cannot be charged wit h knowl edge of a wron gful act agai ns t th em. The co mpl ain t d id no t s pecify an error i n t he con veyance. RA, tab 3 at 1-4 (C ompl., M ar. 20, 2009). Instead, Roland and Ri ta firs t noted the mis take contained in the deed in t heir ans wer and count ercl ai m. RA, t ab 13 at 6 (Defs .' Ans wer & Countercl.). The trial court, in the ruling on the parties' first motions for summary judgment and Roland and Rita's subs equent mot i on for summary j udgment , ment i oned t he error i n i t s deci s i ons and orders but still did not disco ver the d eed was void. See RA, tab 65 at 1 (Dec. & Ord er, Aug. 3 1, 2010 ); RA, tab 77 at 1 (Dec. & Order, May 6, 2011). Both parties and the trial court failed to recognize the deed was void despite engaging in litigation for nearly two-and-a-half years, three s ummary judgment moti ons, and t wo decis ions by the trial court. Therefore, we hol d, as a matt er of l aw, in determi ning when the st atute of limitat ions begi ns to run in an act ion for fraud or mi stake and Burkhart v. Miranda, 2013 Guam 2, Opinion Page 15 of 15 under the facts of this case, Roland and Rita cannot be charged with discovery until the date of this opinion. Accordingly, the statute of limitations does not bar Roland and Rita from arguing on remand that there was an agreement to convey the property. V. CONCLUSIONAsk ⌕⧉ cite

[31]The trial court committed reversible error when it granted summary judgment to Roland and Rita dismissing Rosalinda' s complaint and when it reformed the deed in their favor. We hold that the deed is void for failure to comply with §21 GCA § 4105.Guam Code Annotatedstatute — binding Although the deed is clearly void, the trial court must still determine whether an agreement existed to transfer the property to Roland and Rita. The effective start date for the running of any statute of limitations period shall be the date of this opinion.Ask ⌕⧉ cite

[32]Accordingly, the trial court's decision is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. o is s*" 4 : Robert J. Torres ROBERT J. TORRES Associate Justice 0101.d ate. EjkTARINE A. MARAMAN Associate Justice *%W-SOP"- F. Philip Carbullido PHILIP CARBULLIDO Chief JusticeAsk ⌕⧉ cite